Alberta Associate Chief Justice Releases Dissertation on Maverick Litigants

Associate Chief Justice Rooke of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench has just published his decision in Meads v. Meads. This decision is remarkable and should be, I suggest, required reading for judges, lawyers, court administrators and court clerks across the country.

The judgment in Meads is a treatise, a manifesto and a cri de coeur addressing a certain sort of disaffected, maverick litigant which has been clogging up Canada's courts with contrived, pseudolegal arguments and irrational, histrionic demands for a number of years. Mr. Justice Rooke's judgment identifies, analyses and deconstructs the arguments of vexatious litigants variously known as Detaxers, Freemen or Freemen-on-the-Land, Sovereign Men or Sovereign Citizens, members of the Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International and Moorish Law adherents, and makes recommendations as to how the court should manage such litigants.

The common theme among these groups of litigants, who Mr. Justice Rooke collectively refers to as "Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants," is that they believe themselves to be privy to some secret legal principles which allow them to evade the normal rules and regulations that bind every other member of civil society. These people — and I have encountered them in my practice — drape themselves in cobbled-together pseudolegal verbiage and concepts, such as describing themselves as "corporate entities" or "juristic persons," claiming copyright over their own names and spelling their names with add-on hyphens and colons (the husband in the case before Mr. Justice Rooke, for example, referred to himself as "::Dennis-Larry:Meads::"), and filing bogus pseudolegal documents festooned with gibberish and meaningless symbols, such as thumbprints, multicoloured ink, pompous phrases set in capital letters, stamps and references to inapplicable, foreign or repealed statutes. Mr. Justice Rooke describes a number of improbable hypotheses common to these litigants, including:

1. that the Canada Revenue Agency has tricked persons into believing there is an obligation to pay tax;
2. that various deficiencies in judicial oaths prohibit court action;
3. that the relationship between the state and a person is a contract which one can opt out of;
4. that legislation, the common-law, and court principles and procedures are trumped by divinely ordained rules and principles;
5. that taxes and civil liabilities only attach to a “corporate name” and not physical persons;
6. that the courts have no power over litigants until they surrender to the courts; 
7. that state actors require the consent of persons, any state activity without consent is oppression; and,
8. that public notaries possess a judge-like authority that displaces the authority of Canadian courts.

After an exhaustive review of the many cases across Canada dealing with these and other favourite arguments, Mr. Justice Rooke concludes that the theories of Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants have never gained purchase in a Canadian court.

Mr. Justice Rooke goes on to point out certain common linguistic, documentary, analytic and behavioural hallmarks of these litigants, and suggests a number of procedural devices that can be employed by the courts to manage and curb their excesses.

Court Staff:

1. Reject documents and materials that do not conform to established standards.
2. Mark non-compliant materials as "received" rather than "filed."
3. Forward potentially non-compliant materials to a judicial officer for review before filing.

The Judiciary:

1. Strike actions, applications and defences that are frivolous or vexatious.
2. Award punitive damages where the litigant's conduct is high-handed, abusive or oppressive.
3. Award elevated costs in favour of opposing parties to off-set their increases legal expenses resulting from the litigant's conduct.
4. Make orders that the litigant post security for costs at an early stage of the litigation.
5. Adopt tight approach to case management and assign a single judge to manage the case through to trial.
6. Consider whether the character and nature of the litigation warrants a finding that the litigant is frivolous and vexatious and should be barred from commencing further proceedings without leave.
7. Restrict who may appear as a representative or agent of the litigant.

It isn't particularly difficult to extrapolate from these comments principles of use to lawyers and self-represented parties dealing with such litigants. May I suggest:

Lawyers:

1. Apply to the chief justice for an order appointing a case management judge early on.
2. Consider whether the litigant's claim or defence discloses a legitimate cause of action or defence and apply to strike if it does not.
3. Do not waste your client's money replying to nonsensical pleading or applications in the same voluminous manner as the litigant's material, consider applying for directions.
4. Consider applying for security for costs, bearing in mind the generally high threshold that must be reached before such orders will be made. Search for other reported cases involving the same litigant.
5. Carefully scrutinize the background and motivations of persons seeking approval to appear as a representative or agent, and object where the person is going to exacerbate the situation.

Finally, the concluding remarks of Mr. Justice Rooke deserve repetition:

[71] Dealing with an OPCA litigant is difficult and frustrating. The fact that they are almost always self-represented adds to the challenge. What is worse is if a [OPCA proselytizer] is directly involved. I anticipate most judges will not tolerate representation by these persons ... particularly if the judge understands the nature of the [proselytizer] and his activities. ... 

[72] Timely and cost-effective resolution of these disputes requires that an action be pared down to its legitimate substance. That can be achieved by applications to strike irrelevant submissions and pleadings, and to categorize materials as irrelevant except for the purpose of costs, vexatious litigation and litigant status, and contempt and criminal sanction.

Supreme Court Releases Decision on Agents Appearing in Court

The British Columbia Supreme Court has just released a decision, in the case of Ambrosi v. Duckworth, on the right of parties to have people other than lawyers appear in court on their behalf.

The problem arises from s. 15(1) of the Legal Profession Act which says that "no person, other than a practising lawyer, is permitted to engage in the practice of law;" s. 85 of the act makes it an offence, punishable under the Offence Act, to contravene s. 15. The Legal Profession Act offers a few exceptions to this general prohibition:

• a party to an action may represent him- or herself;
• any person who is entitled to vote in British Columbia may represent someone if the narrow criteria of the Court Agent Act apply (if there are fewer than two practising lawyers in town or if there are fewer than two lawyers with offices within 8km of the courthouse);
• a non-lawyer employed by the Legal Services Society may represent someone within the limits of s. 12 of the Legal Services Society Act; and,
• an articled student may represent someone to the extent permitted by the Law Society.

However, regardless of the Legal Profession Act, the court has the inherent right to control its own process and may, on a case by case basis, allow a non-lawyer to represent someone. That was the issue in Ambrosi when the applicant asked the court for leave for someone to speak on his behalf and present his application.

The judge began his analysis by looking at a 2002 case from the Court of Appeal, R. v. Dick (I've put the important bits in bold):

"[6] The Crown raised a preliminary objection ... and brought to our attention several reasons why [the proposed agent] should not be accorded the privilege of audience. We use the word 'privilege' advisedly, there being clear authority for the proposition that, subject to statutory provisions otherwise, it lies within a court's discretion to permit or not to permit a person who is not a lawyer, to represent a litigant in court. In particular we note the judgment of Lord Denning in Engineers' and Managers' Association v. Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service et al. ... where it was said that the discretionary power to grant a privilege of audience to other persons should be exercised 'rarely and with caution' ...

"[7] There are strong public policy reasons for this general rule. Each court has the responsibility to ensure that persons appearing before it are properly represented and (in the case of criminal law) defended, and to maintain the rule of law and the integrity of the court generally. As was said by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Romanowicz ... :

'The power to refuse audience to an agent must be invoked whenever it is necessary to do so to protect the proper administration of justice. The proper administration of justice requires that the accused's constitutional rights, particularly the right to a fair trial, be protected. It also requires the fair treatment of other participants in the process (eg. witnesses) and that the proceedings be conducted in a manner that will command the respect of the community.

'It is impossible to catalogue all of the circumstances in which representation by a particular agent would imperil the administration of justice and properly call for an order disqualifying that agent. Obviously, representation by agents lacking the ability to competently represent an accused endangers all aspects of the proper administration of justice, particularly the accused's right to a fair trial. Other examples where the administration of justice would suffer irreparable harm if an agent were allowed to appear are found in the material filed on this appeal. ... [There may be] situations in which the agent's criminal record or other discreditable acts are such as to permit the conclusion that the agent cannot be relied on to conduct a trial ethically and honourably.'"

To summarize this somewhat:

1. The court has the discretion to allow an agent to represent a litigant.
2. This discretion should be exercised with restraint, and should be exercised in bearing in mind the need to ensure that the litigant is well-represented, the rule of law is maintained and the integrity of the court is preserved.
3. The court should refuse to allow an agent to act when necessary to protect the proper administration of justice. This might be the case where an agent is incompetent or is unlikely to conduct him- or herself in an ethical manner.
   

Although the applicant presented a number of good reasons why the agent should be allowed to represent him, including the prejudice to his right to a fair hearing, his constitutional right to freedom of expression, his entitlement to appear by an agent of his own choice, and his right to have access to justice, the respondent presented a lengthy body of court decisions reflecting poorly on the proposed agent's past conduct in court. Ultimately, the judge held that:

"[55] I have not been convinced that I should exercise my discretion to allow [the proposed agent] to appear as agent for Mr. Ambrosi. I am satisfied that it would not be in the interest of justice to allow [the proposed agent] to appear as agent. ... I am satisfied that Mr. Ambrosi can afford a lawyer if he wishes, or may even be able to find someone more appropriate to appear as his agent. ..."