Fantastic Elder Law Conference Coming to Vancouver in November: Save the Date!

The Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, Canada's leading providing of continuing professional training for lawyers, and the Canadian Centre for Elder Law are hosting the Canadian Elder Law Conference on 12 and 13 November in 2015. The conference is open to anyone with an interest in the legal and other issues affecting Canada's elders, but will be of most interest to lawyers, financial planners and mental health professionals.

The conference is extremely timely, given Statistics Canada's recent report showing that there are now more Canadians who are older than 65 than those who are under 15. In fact, the baby boomers, the oldest of whom turned 65 in 2011, make up a greater share of the population than any other age group.

The boomers are also the first generation for whom divorce carried only a marginal stigma, as a result of the introduction of the original Divorce Act in 1968. But not only are more older persons divorced or separated than ever before, more are forming new married or unmarried spousal relationships. This poses special challenges for the legal and mental health professionals involved in family breakdown, as we can expect, in the very near future, to be helping more clients with significant physical and mental illnesses, more living on fixed incomes and in poverty, and more requiring institutional or assisted home care. Cases involving persons of retirement age often raise special concerns and competing generational interests about the distribution of income and assets following separation; concerns can also arise about the tension between the interests of employed persons wishing to retire and dependent persons unable to survive without spousal support. Dealing with later-in-life separation also demands a special sensitivity to the needs of women, who have lower incomes than men in general, and are disproportionately affected by separation and divorce.

I've written about the economic consequences of separation and divorce later in life, the federal benefits available to older Canadians and the interplay of spousal support and retirement in a paper for the National Judicial Institute, which you can download (PDF) from the website of the Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family.

This conference is a must for anyone practicing family law or involved in family breakdown from a financial or therapeutic perspective. The full details, including the agenda, are available on CLEBC's website and CCEL's website, but here's the stuff you need to know.

Place: Pan Pacific Hotel, Vancouver BC 

Date: 12 and 13 November 2015, 9:00 am to 4:30pm both days 

CPD Credits: 12.5 hours, including 2 hours on ethics 

Pricing: Early bird registration of $1,005 ($585 for students) ends 15 October 2015. The registration fee thereafter is $1,110 ($585 students), or $990 if you want to attend by webinar.

Keynote speakers include:

• Barb MacLean, Chair of the British Columbia Council to Reduce Elder Abuse
• Isobel Mackenzie, British Columbia's Seniors Advocate
• Dr. Andrew Wister, Chair of the National Seniors Council

Panelists presenting at the conference include myself and: 

• Hon. Marion Allan, Clark Wilson
• Barbara Buchanan, Law Society of British Columbia
• Deidre Herbert, McLellan Herbert
• Anna Laing, Fasken Martineau
• Andrew MacKay, Alexander, Holburn, Beaudin and Lang
• Catherine Romanko, British Columbia Public Guardian and Trustee
• Kimberly Whaley, Whaley Estate Litigation
• Geoffrey White, Geoffrey W. White Law Corporation

The topics to be addressed include:

• Advance health care planning
• Whether a national power of attorney registry would help reduce elder financial abuse
• Update on guardianship law in British Columbia
• Reporting and responding to suspected elder abuse
• Physician assisted suicide and health care decision-making
• Later-in-life separation and divorce
• Dementia and client competency
• Class action litigation in elder and estate law

Save these dates and head on over to CLEBC's website to register now. Space is limited.

Varying Entitlements Not Carried Forward in the FLA

I've been thinking more about the issues raised in my last post, "Court Declines to Determine Application of FLA to Unmarried Spouses Separating Before Act," about the transition to the new Family Law Act and was reminded about a really interesting Provincial Court case my friend Michelle Kinney mentioned that deals with a similar problem: what is the court's jurisdiction when it is asked to vary an order made under the Family Relations Act where the right to ask for the order is not carried forward in the Family Law Act?

The Family Relations Act allowed people to ask for a number of different orders that are no longer available under the Family Law Act. The most important of these are probably the right to ask for parental support, support payable by adults to their parents, and a parent's right to ask for child support from the other parent's new spouse while the parent and spouse are together; the case of D.J. and K.J. v. C.K. and T.K. is about child support.

Under the old act and the new, stepparents can be required to pay child support. Most people are pretty comfortable with that idea. However, the issue raised in cases like McFayden v. Faint and K.A.L. v. J.P.R. was whether a stepparent who is in a continuing relationship with a parent can be required to pay child support to the other parent, and the answer, under the old act, was that in certain circumstances they can. (For an explanation of why this was the case, see my post "Stepparent Caught by Hole in Family Relations Act.") The new law corrects this problem by saying, at s. 149(3)(b), that such applications cannot be brought until the stepparent and parent are separated, and as a result the stepparents in McFayden and K.A.L. find themselves in the unusual situation of being stuck paying child support under an order that could not be made under the present law of British Columbia.

This was more or less the case in D.J. v. C.K., where the parties wisely entered into a consent order (an order that everyone agrees the court should make) in 2011 that required the spouse of one of the parents to pay child support to the other parent. (I say "wisely," because this was the law of the land at that time, and it was prudent of everyone to make a deal rather than going through an expensive and time-consuming court hearing.) However, as time passed the stepparent's income must have gone up, and since the child support obligation of all payors, stepparents or not, is based on income, the recipient brought an application to vary (change) the amount of the stepparent's child support payments. Since this application would not be heard until after the Family Law Act was in effect, the stepparent cleverly made an application of his own to prevent the recipient's application from being heard, on the basis that since the order couldn't be made under the new act, it couldn't be varied under the new act.

(Let me pause here to comment about effect of orders made under the old act. Such orders, whether they could be made under the new act or not, continue to operate and are not affected by the repeal of the old act. This is addressed in several parts of the Interpretation Act:

35 (1) If all or part of an enactment is repealed, the repeal does not...

(c) affect a right or obligation acquired, accrued, accruing or incurred under the enactment so repealed, ...

36 (1) If an enactment ... is repealed and another enactment ... is substituted for it, ...

(b) every proceeding commenced under the former enactment must be continued under and in conformity with the new enactment so far as it may be done consistently with the new enactment, 

(c) the procedure established by the new enactment must be followed as far as it can be adapted in the recovery or enforcement of penalties and forfeitures incurred under the former enactment, in the enforcement of rights existing or accruing under the former enactment, and in a proceeding relating to matters that happened before the repeal, ...

37 (1) The repeal of all or part of an enactment, or the repeal of an enactment and the substitution for it of another enactment, or the amendment of an enactment must not be construed to be or to involve either a declaration that the enactment was or was considered by the Legislature or other body or person who enacted it to have been previously in force, or a declaration about the previous state of the law.

In other words, rights acquired under the Family Relations Act aren't cancelled because the old act has been repealed, and proceedings started under the old act must be continued under the new act in accordance with the new act.)

The stepparent's application was heard by Judge Birnie over the course of several days right after the Family Law Act came into effect, in March and April. This was how the judge characterized the stepparent's essential argument:

"[4] The Respondent argues that as of March 18, 2013 when the Family Relations Act was repealed and replaced by the Family Law Act no child support order, including any variation of an existing order, may be made against a step-parent if that person continues to reside with the biological parent. On an application to vary an existing order the Court may only affirm the order or cancel it. A variation is not permitted."

The respondent's argument was of course much more complicated and nuanced than this brief summary suggests; the argument is set out in detail at paragraphs 5 to 15 of this decision and it seems that the respondent's lawyer did a very good job indeed.

Ultimately, however, the respondent did not succeed. The court held that the right to vary an order is intrinsic to the order itself and cannot be separated from it:

"[17] At the heart of the respondent’s argument is the characterization of child support and the variation of child support as two separate rights. This approach fails to acknowledge the reality that the latter flows necessarily from the former. The right to claim maintenance is the essential right. The right to vary [support] in relation to the circumstances of the child or the payor parent, (and on behalf of either of them), is a right which flows from and cannot exist apart from the underlying support claim. ...

"[19] A [support] order is the key that opens the door to support payments. Applications to vary are, in essence, a means to ensure that an appropriate amount of support flows through the door – an amount which is fair to both the payor and the recipient. The right to vary is an essential component of the right to receive or the obligation to pay child support."

Unfortunately, because of s. 35(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act, the respondent could not argue that the original consent order was void as a result of the repeal of the Family Relations Act. The court further held that in absence of an express provision in the act that prohibited the variation of valid orders made under the former act, such orders can be varied where fairness so requires:

"[25] While the Family Relations Act is repealed effective March 18, 2013, the Family Law Act does not state that any rights or vested interests acquired under the Family Relations Act are extinguished. [The provision] that the coming into force of the Family Law Act is not a change in circumstances for the purpose of changing, suspending or terminating existing orders, suggests the contrary. It is an indication of a legislative intent that the new provisions are prospective only and not intended to disrupt existing rights. 

"[26] The fact that as of March 18, 2013 a [stepparent living with a parent] has no obligation to pay child support does not erase an obligation imposed prior to that date and this is so regardless of whether the legislature’s intent was to narrow what they considered to be an over-broad application of child support obligations in relation to step parents. 

"[27] The Family Law Act does not expressly state that a pre-existing order requiring a [stepparent living with a parent] to pay child support may not be varied and can only be understood to do so implicitly if the right to vary a support order is a right separate and distinct from the right to support which underlies it. ... 

"[28] This interpretation of legislative intent avoids the unfairness to both payor and recipient, of a child support order which cannot be varied in accordance with the circumstances of the parties, but can only be affirmed or terminated. It does not undermine the policy implemented by the Family Law Act toward a step parent’s obligation to pay child support. It simply means that the very few [stepparent living with a parent] who were bound by valid maintenance orders prior to March 18, 2013 continue to be bound to pay maintenance in accordance with their ability to earn income and the child’s needs and subject to the other factors which a court may consider in determining a step parent’s obligations."

My thanks to Michelle for bringing this case to my attention.

Provincial Court Releases Important Decision on Relocation in Polyamorous Relationship

Judge Saunders of the Provincial Court has just released her judgment in the as-yet-unpublished case of Graf v. Beaudoin, giving us what I believe is the court's second ever decision on the relocation provisions of the new Family Law Act.

In a nutshell, the mother of the parties' two children sought an order that she be allowed to take the children and move from British Columbia to Alberta. However, there are a number of factors that distinguish this case from a vanilla interprovincial relocation dispute. First, the parties' eldest child was born during their relationship, while they were living together, and the younger child was born after they had separated. Second, the father had a more or less equal amount of time with the eldest child and a much lesser amount of time with the younger. Third, the parties were involved in a polyamorous relationship with another woman, with whom the father had also had a child, and who resided with them. Finally, the father had earlier had a fourth child with another woman, who had also lived with him and the other woman, and who he continued to parent. As you can guess, this would have made for a pretty complicated set of facts.

The first point, about the timing of the children's births, raises some interesting problems as s. 39 of the Family Law Act would have made both parties the guardians of their eldest child and neither party the guardian of their youngest child. As a result, the relocation provisions of the act would have applied in respect of the first child and not in respect of the second, since only a guardian has standing to prevent a guardian from relocating under s. 68 of the act.

The second point, about the father's time with the parties' two children, means that even if he were a guardian of both children, two different tests might apply to determine the application to relocate under s. 69 as that section prescribes one test where the guardians have a "substantially equal" amount of time with the children and another where they do not. Where guardians do not have substantially equal parenting time, the relocating guardian must prove that:

1. he or she proposes to relocate in good faith; and,
2. he or she has proposed "reasonable and workable arrangements" to maintain the children's relationship with the other guardian.

Where the guardians do have substantially equal parenting time, the relocating guardian must prove that:

1. he or she proposes to relocate in good faith;
2. he or she has proposed reasonable and workable arrangements to maintain the children's relationship with the other guardian; and,
3. the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

The third and fourth points, which require a chart to figure out, means that the parties' two children had very close relationships with their two half-siblings and with two other adults who also played parent-like roles in their upbringing.

As I understand the judge's summary of the parties' positions, counsel for the mother argued that the father was the guardian of the eldest child but should not be the guardian of the youngest child, apparently overlooking the fact that the mother wasn't a guardian of that child either. (I  pause for a moment to reflect on how difficult it would be for the youngest child to grow up knowing that he had the same father as his sister, yet had such an unequal status. The mind boggles.) Counsel also took the view that the mother should have all parental responsibilities in respect of the eldest child, effectively leaving the mother as the sole decision-maker for both children. Counsel for the father, on the other hand, argued that the parties should be the guardians of both children and should have "shared parenting."

In any event, the judge held that the mother should not be allowed to move with the children, holding that:

• the eldest child had been "equally parented by both parents;"
• the father had "considerable" but not "substantially equal" parenting time with the youngest child;
• the youngest child's "considerable exposure" to the father was enough that the relocation test for guardians with "substantially equal" parenting time was the test appropriate test to apply in respect of both children;
• the mother's proposal to relocate was not made in good faith as her motivation was to reduce contact between the children and their father, and by extension reduce the children's contact with their half-siblings and the other women with parenting roles in their lives;
• the mother's proposed arrangements for the children's continuing relationship with the children were not reasonable (Skype is not the best medium for a nine month old child); and,
• the children's best interests would not be advanced by the move as the father is a "hands on and committed father."

After engaging in this analysis, the court determined that the parties should be the guardians of both children, should share parental responsibilities in respect of the children and should have equal parenting time with the children. The parties were both guardians of their eldest child as a result of the presumption of parental guardianship under s. 39(1) of the act, and could only have been appointed as the guardians of the youngest child under s. 51.

Apart from the technical issues arising under the Family Law Act as to who is and isn't a guardian, this case is of primary importance in respect of the issue that wasn't an issue. The fact that the children's parents were involved in a polyamorous relationship had no bearing at all on the court's conclusions, except as to the negative effect of the mother's proposed move in taking the children away from their half-siblings and the other adults involved in their family unit. The parties' choice of a polyamorous lifestyle was a non-issue in the decision, which is precisely as it should be. 

My thanks to my colleague Joanna Recalma for bringing this very interesting case to my attention. I will post a link to the case when it is available from an electronic resource.

The Cleavers Are Moving Out: StatsCan reports on the changing face of the Canadian family

Statistics Canada has published the results of the 2011 Census, and its analysis of the changing makeup of the Canadian family is worthy of note. As CBC's article on the analysis pithily notes, "the nuclear family is no longer the norm in Canada."

The newsbite summary of Statistics Canada's conclusions says this:

• Married-couple families were the predominant family structure in 2011, at 67.0%. For the first time, there were more common-law-couple families in 2011, 16.7%, than lone-parent families, 16.3%.
• The 2011 Census of Population counted 64,575 same-sex couples. In 2011, 32.5% of same-sex couples were married, nearly double the 2006 share. The 2006 to 2011 period marks the first five-year period during which same-sex couples could legally marry, following the legalization of same-sex marriage for all of Canada in July, 2005.
• Stepfamilies were counted for the first time in the 2011 Census of Population, providing a more detailed portrait of Canadian families. There were 464,335 stepfamilies in 2011, or 12.6% of couple families with children aged 24 and under.
• For the first time, there were more one-person households in 2011, 27.6%, than couple households with children aged 24 and under, 26.5%.

Appeal Heard on Unsual Stepparent Child Support Decision

In July 2011 the British Columbia Provincial Court released a very odd judgment on steppparents' liability to pay child support in a case called K.A.L. v. J.P.R. To be clear, it wasn't the court's decision that was odd but the circumstances in which the action was brought.

K.A.L. was followed up a few months later in September with an unreported Provincial Court judgment rendered in an almost identical situation involving parties surnamed Faint, McFayden and Godin. The Supreme Court has just released its decision in the appeal of the unreported case, a decision that might just resolve any appeal brought from K.A.L. as well.

Background

As I pointed out in my post on K.A.L., "Stepparent Caught by Hole in Family Relations Act," the current legislation on family law matters in this province contains one very significant omission:

"The Family Relations Act, British Columbia's primary law on domestic relations, is missing something very important: a triggering event for applications involving custody, guardianship, access, child support and spousal support. Nothing in the law restricts how soon an application on these issues can be made; in particular, nothing says that an application can't be brought while a couple are still together."

The surprising conclusion this led to in both K.A.L. and the unreported case was that a stepparent in an intact relationship with a biological parent was successfully sued for child support by the other biological parent. Both judges found that once the hapless steppparent met the statutory definition of steppparent, he became liable to pay child support to the parent with the primary care of the child, even though still in a relationship with the child's other parent.

K.A.L. came as a bit of a shock to many family law lawyers, yet was well within the plain reading of the Family Relations Act:

1. Each parent of a child is responsible to support a child. (FRA, s. 88(1))
2. The fact that one parent is ordered to pay child support support doesn't stop the other parent from being ordered to pay child support. (FRA, s. 88(2))
3. "Parent" includes biological parents and steppparents, as long as the stepparent has contributed to the support of the child. (FRA, s. 1(1))
4. A "stepparent" is someone who is married to a parent or someone who is in a common-law relationship with a parent (FRA, s. 1(2))

And that's all there is to it. It just took the enterprising parents in K.A.L. and the unreported case to notice it.

The Appeal Decision

In McFayden v. Faint, Ms. McFayden and her husband Mr. Godin appealed the Provincial Court order requiring Mr. Godin, the stepparent of Ms. McFayden's child, to pay child support to Mr. Faint, the child's other parent and the parent with primary care of the child. Cutting to the chase, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court order and gave Mr. Faint his costs to boot.

Here is how the Supreme Court analyzed the situation, and I can do no better than quote from the judgment:

"[16] Section 88 of the FRA describes the obligation of a parent to provide for the support of the child, stating:

(1) Each parent of a child is responsible and liable for the reasonable and necessary support and maintenance of the child.

(2) The making of an order against one parent for the maintenance and support of a child does not affect the liability of another parent for the maintenance and support of the child or bar the making of an order against the other parent.

"[17] Section 1 of the FRA defines 'parent' as including:

(b) a stepparent of a child if

(i) the stepparent contributed to the support and maintenance of the child for at least one year, and

(ii) the proceeding under this Act by or against the stepparent is commenced within one year after the date the stepparent last contributed to the support and maintenance of the child;

"[18] Section 1(2) of the FRA defines 'stepparent' as follows:

(2) For the purpose of paragraph (b) of the definition of 'parent' in subsection (1), a person is the stepparent of a child if the person and a parent of the child

(a) are or were married, or

(b) lived together in a marriage-like relationship for a period of at least 2 years and, for the purposes of this Act, the marriage-like relationship may be between persons of the same gender.

"[19] The Guidelines created by the federal government were adopted for use in B.C.’s FRA through the CSG. The latter defines how the Guidelines and the FRA are to work together.

"[20] Section 1 of the Guidelines sets out its objectives which includes:

(a) to establish a fair standard of support for children that ensures that they continue to benefit from the financial means of both parents after separation. [Emphasis added]

"[21] Mr. Godin submits that s. 1(a) of the Guidelines should be interpreted as being applicable to a stepparent only if he or she is separated from the biological parent. Since he is still married and living with Ms. McFayden he asserts that he is not obligated to pay such child support.

"[22] Mr. Godin acknowledges that he falls within the definition of parent as found in s. (1) and 1(2) of the FRA which leads to the question of whether s. 1(a) of the Guidelines should be interpreted as obliging a stepparent to pay child support as sought by Mr. Faint only if the stepparent is separated from the biological parent.

"[23] In K.A.L., Judge Dickey succinctly addresses the interpretation and application of s. 1(a) of the Guidelines where the stepparent is not separated from the biological parent of the child, stating at para. 18 of his reasons:

[18] In analyzing the issue of whether the 'Objectives' of the Guidelines should guide the interpretation of the FRA, it must be remembered that this is an application under the FRA and not under the Divorce Act and Guidelines. The Divorce Act and Guidelines apply to persons who are, or were, married to each other. The FRA is much broader in scope in that it applies to persons married to one another, persons in a marriage-like relationship, and stepparents. The 'Objectives' of the Guidelines relate to the more restrictive Divorce Act. The Regulation broadens the scope of the Guidelines by adopting them, and then expanding their application by broadening the definitions; see s. 1(3)(h) of the Regulation, in which reference to 'spouse' in the Guidelines is to be read as a reference to 'parent' as defined in the FRA, except for s. 5, in which it is to be read as a reference to 'person'. I also find that the 'children first perspective' of the Guidelines should be used as an interpretation guide to broaden and not narrow the obligation to provide child support, unless the obligation is clearly limited. I find, therefore, that the restrictive nature of the 'Objectives' of the Guidelines does not limit the child support obligations as found in the FRA.

"[24] The approach taken by Judge Dickey in K.A.L. is consistent with that found in Adler v. Jonas, a case involving a stepparent’s obligation to pay child support to his wife’s child. Mr. Justice Hardinge wrote at para. 20:

... I think it appropriate to note here that the provisions of the Family Relations Act should be given a liberal interpretation wherever its provisions relate to children. In Prichard v. Prichard, Spencer J. of this court said at paragraph 6:

The Act as a whole should be given an interpretation consistent with its objective of regulating the affairs of families in the broad sense. Where it deals with children it should be construed liberally in their favour to provide for their 'reasonable support'.

"[25] I concur with the liberal interpretation adopted by Judge Dickey in K.A.L. and affirmed by Judge Donegan in Faint when he concluded that Mr. Godin had a legislated obligation to pay child support for [the child], and that it was not relevant that Mr. Godin and Ms. McFayden were still married and living together."

In other words, the analysis in K.A.L. was bang on and accurately interpreted the more liberal provisions of the Family Relations Act as appropriately capturing stepparents in ongoing relationships with the parent of a child.

Stepparent Caught by Hole in Family Relations Act

Important Update: The Family Law Act was introduced on 14 November 2011 and contains a number of provisions which are critical to the comments made in this post. See my post "Family Law Act Introduced!" for more information.

The Family Relations Act, British Columbia's primary law on domestic relations, is missing something very important: a triggering event for applications involving custody, guardianship, access, child support and spousal support. Nothing in the law restricts how soon an application on these issues can be made; in particular, nothing says that an application can't be brought while a couple are still together.

This isn't usually a problem, of course, since people are usually pretty annoyed when they decide to sue one another, and if they haven't split up by the time litigation commences, the commencement of litigation will usually do it. However, there can be odd consequences when other people, like grandparents or former spouses, step into the picture, since nothing says when they can and can't make applications of their own. (I made some comments about this during the consultation phase of the Family Relations Act Review, and there's a chance that the new legislation will correct this issue.) The legislative chickens came home to roost for one stepfather after an application by the child's biological father in a case recently before the Provincial Court and brought to my attention by my friend Agnes Huang of Schuman Daltrop Basran Robin.

In K.A.L. v J.P.R., the biological father brought an application for an order that the mother's new spouse - his child's stepfather - pay child support. So far this is fine, since stepparents are also liable to pay child support. The catch, though, is that the stepfather and the child's mother were together when the father brought his application!

The judge made a very thorough review of the Family Relations Act and the Child Support Guidelines for the following basic principles:

1. Each parent of a child is responsible to support a child. (FRA, s. 88(1))
2. The fact that one parent is ordered to pay child support support doesn't stop the other parent from being ordered to pay child support. (FRA, s. 88(2))
3. "Parent" includes biological parents and steppparents, as long as the stepparent has contributed to the support of the child. (FRA, s. 1(1))
   
4. A "stepparent" is someone who is married to a parent or someone who is in a common-law relationship with a parent (FRA, s. 1(2))
5. Child support orders are to be made using the Child Support Guidelines tables. (FRA, s. 93(1))
6. Child support orders can be made in a different amount than the Guidelines tables, but only when there is an order or written agreement that provides a benefit to the child in some way and it would be unfair to apply the Guidelines tables. (FRA, s. 93(2))
7. Child support orders against stepparents can also be made in a different amount than the Guidelines tables as a result of "any other parent's legal duty to support the child." (CSG, s. 5)
   

And there you have it. Parents are liable to pay child support, stepparents are liable to pay child support for the benefit of a child, more than one "parent" can be required to pay child support at the same time, and nothing says when an application can and can't be made or restricts when a parent can bring the application. As a result:

"I, therefore, find that when one reads the legislated scheme for child support as a whole, and give the wording its 'grammatical and ordinary sense', a stepparent who satisfies the definition of 'parent' and lives with the parent of a child, is still obligated to make child support payments. This obligation occurs despite the fact that the parent of the child is also obligated to make child support payments."

"The [father] is entitled to bring a claim against the respondent stepfather for child support pursuant to s. 5 of the Guidelines."

Now, the judge didn't make an order against the stepfather at this point, and nor did the judge comment on who might be the recipient of the child support order. That will be the subject of a future application, and I expect that some interesting arguments will be advanced. I also wonder whether, some time before that application, the mother and the stepfather will enter into a written agreement under which the stepfather provide sufficient indirect benefits to the child that his child support obligation will be exhausted.

Journal Publishes List of Stepfamily Self-Help Books

The December 2009 edition of Family Relations, an organ of the National Council on Family Relations, contains a very interesting article in which the authors evaluate the usefulness of 64 self-help books for stepfamilies based on readability, content, references to the scientific literature, the qualifications of the author and comprehensiveness.

Without getting into the details of the article, the 13 books which made it into the "strongly recommended" list were, in alphabetical order:

1. Boyd, H. The step-parent's survival guide (1998, London, Ward Lock)
2. Fletcher, J.B. A career girl's guide to becoming a step-mom (2007, New York, Harper)
3. Lauer, R.H. & Lauer, J.C. Becoming family: How to build a stepfamily that really works (1999, Minneapolis, Augsburg)
4. Lutz, E. The complete idiot's guide to stepparenting (1998, New York, Alpha)
5. Mulford, P.G. Keys to successful stepmothering (1996, Hauppauge, Barron's)
6. Newman, M. Stepfamily realities: How to overcome difficulties and have a happy family (1993, Oakland, New Harbinger)
7. Norwood, P.K. & Wingender, T. The enlightened stepmother (1999, New York, Avon)
8. O'Connor, A. The truth about stepfamilies (2004, New York, Marlowe)
9. Pickhardt, C.E. Keys to successful stepfathering (1997, Hauppauge, Barron's)
10. Rosenblum, G. Stepfamilies: Making it great (2000, Minneapolis, Creative Publishing)
11. Thomas, S. Two happy homes (2005, Longmont, Spingboard Publications)
12. Tufnell, C. & Tufnell, T. Every step counts (2007, Oxford, Lion)
13. Visher, E.B. & Visher, J.S. How to win as a stepfamily (1991, New York, Routledge)

"An Evaluation of the Remarriage and Stepfamily Self-Help Literature" was written by Marilyn Coleman and Lynette Nickleberry, both of the University of Missouri.